4. Anhang 4.1 Re: Tastes and Talents Dear Mr Van Parijs I've got a question about your philosophical concept of tastes and talents which concerns me personally. [...] - I'm transsexual, my body is clearly male while I want to be a woman. Is this an expensive taste (given the surgery neccessary to make my body look female) or an unfortunate talent? One might argue that my wish to be a woman is comparable to Jackson wanting to be an exceptional runner and therefore envies Johnson's internal endowment [siehe Van Parijs 1995: 63]. On the other hand, I think it's save to say that it is una- nimously shared that no one would like to live in the subjectively wrong gender role. The question is whether my preference to be a woman is malleable or not. The answer is not altogether clear, although newer studies seem to indicate that it's not - analogous to sexual preferences. But of course a lesbian could also live (against her will) with a man and I could also live as a man - but I sup- pose that's not your understanding of real freedom for all and undominated diversity. I think you're absolutely right with your claim that people should be held responsible for their tastes but not for their talents. But it might not be that easy to distinguish between tastes and talents in real life situations. [...] You certainly have thought about this problem intensively. I'm interested in what you think about it. [...] Dear Esther Brunner, Many thanks for your interesting question, which you phrase very well. As a first cut, as you suggest, RFA requires that a preference for a particular gender role be treated like a preference for playing a particular musical instrument. Of course, «it is unanimously shared that no one would like to live in the subjectively wrong gender role», just as it is unanimously shared that no one would like to long for his / her whole life for playing an instrument he is unable to play. Nonetheless, if some mentally or financially demanding training, operation, etc. is needed to better fulfill the preference, it will be up to the person concerned to bear the cost. And if no such procedure is available, no compensation is due to the person with the «wrong» gender or ta- lent. But there is, as you suggest too, one way of appealing against this tough verdict: by arguing that preference for a particular gender role is less like a taste for playing a particular musical instrument and more like having a disposi- tion to be exceptionally thirsty. Even if failing to satisfy this thirst is not fatal, but only the source of permanent dis- comfort, it makes sense to make this thirst part of a person's endowment, and therefore a potential candidate for subsidised intervention or compensation by virtue of undominated diversity. Whether something analogous can be said in the case of non-matching equipments and preference for gender ro- les, you are far better qualified to judge. The more psychology and the less physiology enters the dynamics of the desire, the larger the grey area. In this case as in any other, the presumption must be on the side of malleability: it is possible for those with expensive tastes to be plausibly told «Pull yourselves together!», even though they may have respectable reasons to choose not to do so (at their own expense). But sometimes they would want to, and re- ally cannot. If this condition is fulfilled in the case you raise, as it might well be, solidarity can legitimately be cal- led upon. Mit herzlichem Gruss, Philippe (Van Parijs 2001) 5. Literaturverzeichnis Mill, John Stuart Über die Freiheit. [engl. Original: On Liberty , 1859], Stuttgart 1974. zusammen mit Harriet Taylor Mill, Helen Taylor: Die Hörigkeit der Frau. [engl. Original: The Subjection of Woman, 1869], Frankfurt am Main 1991. Alter, Helma Katrin Gleiche Chancen für alle. Transidentität, Transsexualität, Transgender, Trans* ???, Norderstedt 1999. Sen, Amartya Ökonomie für den Menschen. [engl. Original: Development as Freedom, 1999], München 2000. Van Parijs, Philippe Real Freedom for All. What (if anything) can justify capitalism?, Oxford 1995. Re: Tastes and Talents. [E-Mail an Esther Brunner], unveröffentlicht 2001. Esther Brunner: Über Individualität bei Mill am Beispiel von Transsexualität Seite 13